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Case No. 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
T«F riTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OPINION J3ELOW 
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1 C\ A f T + - ^ U 7V^i 
Marcr ;• , t a c h e d h e r e t o H : A p p e n d i x A 
it: LOuI't 
appeal. , • v^  .ri-^d^s je:..e. 
A p p e l l a n t ' s ^-r^tio:: : i '-eheacing. *oi ,r \:iat •"our:1, order 
^ v tne Petition lor Rehearing is attached hereto as Appendix B 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion on March 21, 
1989. Appellant filed her Petition for Rehearing on April 4, 1989. 
The Petition for Rehearing tolled the period in which this Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari must be filed. "Rule 451c), Rules of the \3tah 
Supreme Court (1986). This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
therefore timely filed pursuant to Rule 45, Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1988) and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 
1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 (1953 as amended). Ms. Johnson 
was found guilty on April 1, 1987, after a bench trial in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed her conviction in a decision dated March 21, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 3, 1986, Deputy Stroud stopped a 1972 Mercury 
Capri with a broken brake light (T. 5-6). Prior to approaching the 
vehicle, the officer ran a check on the license plates and obtained 
the name of the registered owner (T. 6). He then approached the 
driver and asked for identification (T. 6). 
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The driver produced a driver's license but was unable to 
produce registration which the officer requested when he learned 
that the driver was not the registered owner (T. 6). The officer 
then asked the passenger, the Petitioner in this case, for 
identification (T. 6-7).1 Petitioner told the officer she did not 
have identification but gave him her name and date of birth. The 
deputy took the driver's license and information from Petitioner to 
his vehicle where he called dispatch and inquired whether there were 
any outstanding warrants on Petitioner (T. 7, 15). The deputy 
testified that he ran a check on Ms. Johnson n[b]ecause there was a 
possibility that [the] vehicle could have been stolen" (T. 7-8). 
However, the officer did not ask the driver how she came 
to be in possession of the vehicle or otherwise attempt to ascertain 
whether the vehicle was stolen by questioning the driver or 
Petitioner. The officer also did not run a check to determine 
whether the car was stolen (T. 12) and acknowledged that it was not 
unusual to stop cars and find that the owner was not driving (T. 17, 
18). 
The car was in fact not stolen (T. 16) and the only 
1 In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals relied 
on the trial judge's statement "that where there is a legitimate 
traffic stop, the driver has a suspended license, and there is 'no 
way of telling who the owner of the vehicle is and whether they have 
permission to drive it because the owner is not present,' a 
reasonable officer would inquire regarding the identity of a 
passenger." Johnson, 104 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35. However, the 
officer did not learn that the driver's license was suspended until 
after he detained Ms. Johnson and ran a warrants check on her 
(T. 8). Both courts erred in relying on this information. 
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information which made the officer speculate that it might be stolen 
was the fact that the registered owner was not driving and the 
driver was unable to find registration materials (T. 7-8). Other 
than being a passenger in the vehicle, Ms. Johnson did not say or do 
anything which would suggest that, even if the vehicle were stolen, 
she was involved in the criminal activity. 
The officer further acknowledged that ascertaining 
whether Ms. Johnson had a valid driver's license would not help him 
determine whether the car was stolen (T. 15) but claimed that if 
Ms. Johnson had outstanding warrants for car theft, he "possibly" 
would think it more likely that the vehicle had been stolen (T. 16). 
The officer testified that it was his normal procedure to 
obtain the name and date of birth of passengers in a traffic stop 
and that he routinely used this practice to pick up people who might 
have outstanding warrants (T. 20, 21). 
Several minutes after the officer returned to his 
vehicle, dispatch informed him that the driver had a suspended 
license and Ms. Johnson had an outstanding traffic warrant (T. 7, 8, 
15). The officer arrested Ms. Johnson and, incident to that arrest, 
searched her bag and found the evidence which gave rise to the 
instant case (T. 9-11). 
Prior to trial, Ms. Johnson filed a motion to suppress 
all evidence seized from her person or property on the grounds that 
the items seized were the fruit of an unlawful seizure of her person 
in violation of the fourth amendment to the federal constitution and 
Article I, §14 of the Utah Constitution. See Appendix C. The trial 
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court held an evidentiary hearing, after which it denied the motion 
"unless defendant can submit law to the contrary" (R. 17). See 
trial judge's ruling from the bench, T. 35-36, as set forth in 
Appendix D. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
THAT THE OFFICER HAD A REASONABLE ARTICULABLE 
SUSPICION TO JUSTIFY THE DETENTION OF PETITIONER 
FOR A WARRANTS CHECK IS IN CONFLICT WITH EXISTING 
FOURTH AMENDMENT CASE LAW. 
A majority of the panel in the Court of Appeals which 
heard the instant case held that the officer had a reasonable 
articulable suspicion to justify the detention of Ms. Johnson under 
the fourth amendment. Johnson, 104 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35-6. Judge 
Orme dissented, stating simply: 
The only facts relied on by the officer were that 
the driver's name was not the name of the 
registered owner and the driver was not able to 
locate the registration certificate. These facts 
are just as consistent with the more likely 
scenario that the driver borrowed the car from its 
rightful owner. Absent more—and this is all the 
officer pointed to—there was simply no 
articulable suspicion, as a matter of law, that 
the car had been stolen. 
Id. at 36. In reaching its decision, the majority misconstrued the 
facts in this case and misapplied the law. 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States 
Supreme Court carved out a limited exception to the general probable 
cause requirement under the fourth amendment. In order to justify a 
particular detention, an officer must be able to point to specific 
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articulable facts which, when viewed under an objective standard, 
create a reasonable suspicion that the defendant has committed or is 
about to commit a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). This Court and the Utah 
Court of Appeals have applied that standard in numerous cases. See 
e.g. State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 719 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); 
State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 675 (Utah 1986); State v. Trujillo, 739 
P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 
1988). 
As the Court of Appeals held (and the State did not 
dispute in its brief), the officer seized Ms. Johnson within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment when he detained her to run a 
warrants check. See Johnson, 104 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35; see also 
United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973) (detaining a 
defendant for a warrants check is a seizure under the fourth 
amendment and requires that the officer have a reasonable 
articulable suspicion to justify the seizure). 
The only articulable facts known to the officer at the 
time he detained Ms. Johnson were that the driver was not the owner 
of the vehicle and the driver could not find the registration. The 
Court of Appeals erred in relying on the trial court's statement that 
where there is a legitimate traffic stop, the 
driver has a suspended license, and there is "no 
way of telling who the owner of the vehicle is and 
whether they have permission to drive it because 
the owner is not present," a reasonable officer 
would inquire regarding the identity of a 
passenger. 
104 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35 (emphasis added). Contrary to the 
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assertions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the officer 
did not know that the driver's license was suspended when he 
detained the passenger (T. 8). The officer simply asked the 
Petitioner her name immediately after obtaining identification from 
the driver, because it was his normal procedure to run the name and 
date of birth of passengers in traffic stops and he routinely used 
this practice to pick up people who might have outstanding warrants 
(T. 20, 21). 
In an attempt to justify the detention, the officer 
testified that he ran a check on Petitioner n[b]ecause there was a 
possibility that [the] vehicle could have been stolen" (T. 7-8). 
However, he did not ask the driver or Petitioner who owned the car 
or how the driver came to be in possession of it. Nor did he run a 
check to see whether it was stolen (T. 12) or otherwise pursue that 
"possibility.n 
A "possibility" is not equivalent to a constitutionally 
required reasonable articulable suspicion. It is more along the 
lines of a hunch or speculation, neither of which support a seizure 
under the fourth amendment. See State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 90 
(Utah App. 1987) . 
Furthermore, a "possibility" that a car is stolen does 
not automatically implicate the passenger in any illegal activity. 
See State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1382-3 (Utah 1986). "[A] 
person's mere presence in the company of others whom the police have 
probable cause to search does not provide probable cause to search 
that person." J[<3. citing United States v. Pi Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587, 
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68 S.Ct. 222, 225, 92 L.Ed.2d 210 (1948). 
Furthermore, assuming arguendo the meager facts known to 
the officer at the time he detained Ms. Johnson did in some way 
amount to a reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle was 
stolen and that Ms. Johnson was somehow implicated, the officer 
exceeded the scope of any permissible seizure when he detained 
Ms. Johnson to run a warrants check on her. The permissible scope 
of any detention would be limited to investigation necessary to 
ascertain whether the vehicle was in fact stolen.2 The officer 
acknowledged that ascertaining whether Ms. Johnson had a valid 
driver's license would not help him determine whether the car was 
stolen (T. 15). Furthermore, all of his actions and his testimony 
(T. 20, 21) indicated that he did not believe the car was stolen but 
was on a "fishing expedition" to see whether he could find some 
basis for arresting either occupant of the vehicle. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the officer 
detained Ms. Johnson based on a hunch, speculation or "possibility" 
and not a constitutionally required reasonable articulable suspicion. 
While at first glance this case may seem somewhat 
inconsequential, the effect of the decision of the Court of Appeals 
could be overwhelming. It leaves officers with unbridled discretion 
to detain and run a warrants check on all passengers in vehicles 
where the owner is not present. Persons who look a little different 
2 The car was in fact not stolen (T. 16). Ms. Johnson 
was riding with a friend to pick up a child at school (T. 24). 
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or who officers want to "shake down" will be detained while 
wealthier, more mainstream people riding in borrowed cars will not 
be seized for warrants checks. 
Even though common sense and the police officer in the 
instant case agree that it is not unusual to stop cars and find that 
the owner is not present (T. 17, 18) and even though the absence of 
the registered owner is as consistent with innocent behavior as it 
is with criminal behavior (104 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36, Orme, J., 
dissenting), officers will be free to detain all occupants of a 
vehicle who are riding in borrowed cars. Such a result does not 
comport with the freedoms guaranteed by our society or with the 
reasonable expectation of privacy guaranteed by the fourth amendment, 
Ms. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court grant 
her Petition for Writ of Certiorari on this issue. 
POINT II. IN REACHING ITS DECISION THAT APPELLANT 
FAILED TO PRESERVE THE UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE 
FOR REVIEW, THE COURT 
IMPORTANT 
BEEN ', BUT 
QUESTION OF 
SHOULD BE, 1 
OF APPEALS DECIDED AN 
STATE 
DECIDED 
LAW 
BY 
WHICH 
THIS 
HAS NOT 
COURT. 
In her opening brief before the Court of Appeals, 
Appellant/Petitioner argued that her detention violated Utah 
statutory and constitutional law. See Appellant's opening brief at 
9-12. She argued that the search and seizure provision of the Utah 
Constitution offers a greater protection than its federal 
counterpart and cited several cases from other jurisdictions which 
had been decided on state constitutional grounds in support of her 
argument, e.g. State v. Williams, 366 So.2d 1369 (La. 1978). See 
Appendix E for entire text of Petitioner's argument on this issue in 
her opening brief. 
In its decision, the Court of Appeals declined to address 
this argument because "defendant failed to brief or argue these 
issues at the trial level . . . ." State v. Johnson, 104 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 34, 35 (Utah App. 1989). The Court stated that " [ nominally 
alluding to such different constitutional guarantees without any 
analysis before the trial court does not sufficiently raise the 
issue to permit consideration by this Court on appeal [citation 
omitted]." Id. 
In her written Motion to Suppress in the instant case, 
Petitioner specifically stated that the Utah Constitution had been 
violated.3 in her Memorandum in Support of that Motion to 
Suppress, Petitioner correctly referred to Article I, Section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution. At oral argument on the Motion to Suppress, 
Petitioner also referred to the Utah Constitution. Defense counsel 
stated: 
. . . I think it violates the Utah Constitution as 
well, although that has not been developed in the 
case law very well, 
T. 40. Hence, in the instant case, Petitioner specifically referred 
to the state constitution and recognized that there had been no 
separate analysis in making her argument to the trial court. She 
afforded the trial court every opportunity to decide the issue under 
3 Petitioner erroneously referred to Article I, 
Section 13 of the Utah Constitution in this motion. See Appendix C, 
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the Utah Constitution. 
In State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), a majority 
of this Court, comprised of Justice Hall, Justice Howe and Justice 
Orme of the Court of Appeals, pointed out that this Court has never 
drawn any distinctions between the protections afforded by the Utah 
Constitution and the federal constitution in the search and seizure 
context. However, in footnote 8, this Court pointed out that: 
in declining to depart in this case from our 
consistent refusal heretofore to interpret 
Article I, Section 14 of the our constitution in a 
manner different from the fourth amendment to the 
federal constitution, we have by no means ruled 
out the possibility of doing so in some future 
case. 
JEd. at 1221. 
In his dissent in Watts, Justice Zimmerman pointed out 
that he did not agree with the majority's assertions that the Court 
had never drawn any distinctions between the two constitutions. Id. 
at 1225. Justice Durham concurred with Justice Zimmerman's dissent. 
Given the uncertainty reflected in Watts as to whether 
any distinctions between the search and seizure provisions in the 
two constitutions have been drawn in the past or will be drawn in 
the future, defense counsel's statement that the Utah constitutional 
provision "has not been developed in the case law very well" (T. 40) 
raised the issue for the trial court and reflected the current state 
of the law. 
The decision in Watts also reflects what has become a 
difficult position for criminal defense lawyers. Criminal defense 
lawyers are, for the most part, aware that this Court is interested 
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in a separate analysis of issues under the Utah Constitution. 
However, because very little separate Utah Constitutional case law 
has been developed and because other states rarely offer a case on 
point, defense lawyers often have little substance to argue other 
than that if the federal constitution does not protect the 
defendant, the state constitution does. Given the paucity of state 
constitutional case law, such an argument at the trial level should 
preserve a Utah Constitutional issue for appellate review. 
In reaching its decision that this issue had not been 
preserved for appeal, the Court of Appeals relied on two opinions of 
this Court, State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985), and State v. 
Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981). In Lee, the defendant had argued at 
the trial court that the search was unlawful, thereby making the 
seizure unlawful, but had not argued that the seizure alone was 
unconstitutional. On appeal, the defendant raised the seizure issue 
for the first time, and this Court refused to address it. Lee, 633 
P.2d at 52-3. 
In Carter, the defendant argued at the trial court that 
the frisk of his person following his arrest was unlawful. On 
appeal, he argued for the first time that the search of his backpack 
was unlawful because it was out of his possession at the time of the 
search. This Court again refused to address the issue because it 
had not been raised in the trial court. Carter, 707 P.2d at 660-1. 
Unlike Carter or Lee, Petitioner did not bring up the 
Utah Constitutional issue for the first time on appeal. 
Petitioner's argument throughout has been that the detention of her 
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person, where she was a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a faulty 
equipment violation, was unlawful. She in fact raised the Utah 
constitutional issue in the trial court and recognized that a 
separate Utah Constitutional analysis has not yet been developed in 
case law. Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended) is 
merely a codification of the constitutional protections against 
search and seizure and is raised implicitly when either the federal 
or state constitutional provision is argued. 
The haste with which matters proceed to trial and the 
practical realities of criminal defense practice rarely offer trial 
attorneys the opportunity to fully research an issue, especially in 
an area where this Court or the Court of Appeals has not yet issued 
an opinion and the likelihood that the trial court would rule 
favorably is slim. The impact of the Johnson decision, if it is 
allowed to remain as the Court of Appeals has written it, may be 
that this Court and the Court of Appeals will see less briefing on 
state constitutional issues because in most cases, even where trial 
counsel separately referred to the state constitution, there will be 
a serious preservation issue on appeal. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals fails to give 
criminal defendants a clear picture of the extent of argument which 
is necessary at the trial court level in order to preserve a state 
constitutional issue for appeal. Where provisions of the state 
constitution have not been analyzed in case law requiring trial 
counsel to do more than name the applicable provision of the Utah 
Constitution leaves appellate and trial counsel in a "never-never 
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land" where it is unclear in almost any case where little analysis 
exists as to what exactly must be done to preserve an issue. The 
next step from Johnson is to refuse to review an issue on appeal 
because in making his argument on appeal, defendant emphasizes a 
case which he did not rely on at the trial court level. Such a 
position would turn the requirement that an issue be preserved at 
trial into an elaborate game for which no one knows the precise 
rules. 
Ms. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court grant a 
writ of certiorari on this issue, issue a bright line ruling that 
argument at the trial court that a specific article and section of 
the Utah Constitution is violated is sufficient to preserve a Utah 
Constitutional issue for appellate review, and address the Utah 
constitutional issue raised in this case. 
- 14 -
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Johnson respectfully requests that this Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari be granted and that this Court review the issues 
addressed herein. 
SUBMITTED this V day of May, 1989. 
tUx-h-' 
DEBRA-K. LOY 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that ten copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 and four copies to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
this V day of May, 1989. 
<^$4~C.CL&*< 
J0SN C. WATT 
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DELIVERED by this day 
of May, 1989. 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Karen Marie JOHNSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 870222-CA 
FILED: March 21, 1989 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
ATTORNEYS: 
Debra K. Loy, Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellants 
Dan R. Larsen, R. Paul Van Dam, Salt Lake 
City, for Respondents 
Before Judges Davidson, Garff and Orme. 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
Defendant, Karen Marie Johnson, appeals 
the trial court's denial of her motion to sup-
press and her conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance.1 We affirm. 
On November 3, 1986, Deputy Sheriff 
Stroud stopped a vehicle for having a faulty 
brake light. Defendant was a passenger in that 
vehicle. At the suppression hearing, Stroud 
testified that prior to stopping the vehicle, he 
ran a check on the license plate and obtained 
the name of the registered owner. He then 
approached the stopped vehicle and asked the 
driver for her license. The name on the license 
was not the name of the registered owner. 
When Stroud requested the registration certi-
ficate, the driver was unable to produce it. 
Stroud then asked defendant for identifica-
tion, reasoning that there was a possibility the 
car was stolen because there was no registra-
tion and no owner present. After initially 
denying that she had any identification, defe-
ndant told Stroud her name and birthdate. 
Stating that he would be right back and 
expecting the driver and defendant to remain, 
Stroud returned to his vehicle and ran license 
checks on the two, determining that the driver 
was driving on a suspended license and that 
defendant had several outstanding warrants. 
He did not, however, inquire as to whether the 
car was stolen, nor did he know of any reports 
of stolen cars matching that car's description. 
He then wrote a citation on the driver and 
requested a backup police officer. 
When defendant was informed that she was 
being arrested for outstanding warrants, she 
exited the vehicle, holding a backpack which 
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had the name "Karen" on it. Defendant initi-
ally denied that the backpack belonged to her, 
but later admitted that it was hers. Incident to 
her arrest, the bag was searched and was 
found to contain amphetamines, drug parap-
hernalia and defendant's Utah identification. 
Defendant's version of the sequence of 
events varies from Stroud's. She testified that 
after Stroud received the driver's license, he 
asked defendant if she had any identification. 
She said that she did not. He told them to 
wait, that he would be right back, and retu-
rned to his vehicle for fi\e or ten minutes, 
long enough for her to smoke a cigarette or 
two. When he returned, he asked for the reg-
istration certificate. When it could not be 
produced, Stroud asked defendant to return to 
his vehicle with him, where, at his request, she 
gave him her name and birthdate. He then 
sent her back to the other car. Fifteen minutes 
later, he came back to their car, gave the 
driver a citation, took defendant out of the 
car, frisked and handcuffed her, and put her 
in the front seat of the sheriffs car. She had 
possession of her bag at this time. Defendant 
stated that she gave Stroud her name and 
birthdate because she was required to do so, 
and did not believe that she could leave. 
The issues on appeal are: (1) whether defe-
ndant may raise, for the first time on appeal, 
the argument that state law and article 1 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution provide 
greater protection than the fourth amendment 
of the United States Constitution against 
unreasonable search and seizure; (2) whether 
defendant, a passenger in a motor vehicle, was 
seized within the meaning of the fourth ame-
ndment; and (3) if there was a seizure, 
whether it was reasonable. 
In considering the trial court's action in 
denying defendant's motion to suppress, we 
will not disturb its factual evaluation unless its 
findings are clearly erroneous. State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). The 
trial judge is in the best position to assess the 
credibility and accuracy of the witnesses' 
divergent testimonies. State v. Arroyo, 102 
Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 35 (Ct. App. Feb. 15, 
1989); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). However, in assessing the trial 
court's legal conclusions based upon its 
factual findings, we afford it no deference but 
apply a "correction of error" standard. Oafes 
v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 658,659 (Utah 1988). 
UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE 
Defendant claims that her detention violated 
the fourth amendment of the United States 
Constitution and article 1 section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. She also argues that the 
legislative intent behind Utah Code Ann. §77-
7-15 (1980) was to provide greater protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures 
than is provided by the fourth amendment, 
and that her seizure violated the provisions of 
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both constitutions.2 However, defendant failed 
to brief or argue these issues at the trial level 
and first raised her statutory argument in her 
appellate brief. Nominally alluding to such 
different constitutional guarantees without any 
analysis before the trial court does not suffi-
ciently raise the issue to permit consideration 
by this court on appeal. James v. Preston, 746 
P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). "[W]here 
a defendant fails to assert a particular ground 
for suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence 
in the trial court, an appellate court will not 
consider that ground on appeal .... [M]otions 
to suppress should be supported by precise 
averments, not conclusory allegations ...." State 
v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 
1985). Also, in State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 53 
(Utah 1981), the supreme court stated: 
There is nothing in the record to 
indicate that the point now urged 
upon this Court was unavailable or 
unknown to defendant at the time 
he filed his motion to suppress, and 
to entertain the point now would be 
to sanction the practice of withho-
lding positions that should properly 
be presented to the trial court but 
which may be withheld for the 
purpose of seeking a reversal on 
appeal and a new trial or dismissal. 
We, therefore, decline to consider this argu-
ment on appeal. 
SEIZURE 
Defendant avers that she was seized within 
the meaning of the fourth amendment because 
she felt that she was not free to leave when 
Stroud told her to wait while he returned to 
his vehicle to check on the driver's license and 
to run a warrants check on defendant. "A 
seizure within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment occurs only when the officer by 
means of physical force or show of authority 
has in some way restricted the liberty of a 
person." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). further, "[w]hen a 
reasonable person, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of 
cooperation ... but because he believes he is 
not free to leave," a seizure occurs. Id.; see 
also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980). Defe-
ndant was, therefore, seized when Stroud took 
her name and birthdate and expected her to 
wait while he ran a warrants check. Under the 
totality of the circumstances, defendant was 
reasonably justified in her belief that she was 
not free to go. 
Now, the concern is whether the seizure was 
reasonable and permissible under the fourth 
amendment. In State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 
616 (Utah 1987) (per curiam), the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted the reasoning in United 
States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 
Johnson ~-
utv. Rep. 34 £ £ 
I (5th Cir. 1984), wherein the Fifth Circuit 
specified three constitutionally permissible 
levels of police stops: 
(1) an officer may approach a 
citizen at anytime [sic] and pose 
questions so long as the citizen is 
not detained against his will; (2) an 
officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an "articulable suspi-
cion" that the person has committed 
or is about to commit a crime; 
however, the "detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than 
is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer 
may arrest a suspect if the officer 
has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is 
being committed. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-18. 
We conclude that the present case involves a 
"level two" stop. Thus, to justify the seizure, 
Stroud had to have a reasonable "articulable 
suspicion" that defendant had committed a 
crime. To determine if he acted reasonably 
under the circumstances, "due weight must be 
given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific rea-
sonable inferences which he is entitled to draw 
from the facts in light of his experience." Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 
1883(1968). 
At this point, we defer to the findings of the 
trial judge because of his preferred position in 
evaluating the witnesses5 credibility. See 
Arroyo, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35. The record 
indicates that the trial court believed Stroud's 
testimony in concluding there was an articul-
able suspicion that defendant had committed a 
crime. Prior to asking defendant for identifi-
cation, Stroud believed that there was a pos-
sibility the car wats stolen because the owner 
was absent and there was no registration. He 
knew that the driver was not the owner, but 
determined that it was reasonable to ask def-
endant her name to determine if it correspo-
nded with the owner's name he had learned 
prior to stopping the vehicle. The fact that 
Stroud initially chose to do a warrants check 
instead of a stolen vehicle check is of no great 
significance because not all stolen cars are 
reported immediately. The trial judge stated 
that where there is a legitimate traffic stop, 
the driver has a suspended license, and there is 
"no way of telling who the owner of the 
vehicle is and whether they have permission to 
drive it because the owner is not present," a 
reasonable officer would inquire regarding the 
identity of a passenger. In weighing the testi-
mony, the court was justified in finding that 
the amount of time defendant was required to 
wait, even though a passenger, was reasonable 
and did not take any longer than a normal 
traffic stop. 
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Thus, there was substantial evidence for the 
trial court to find as it did. Although a seizure 
occurred, it conformed to constitutional req-
uirements in that Officer Stroud had a reaso-
nable articulable suspicion that the car could 
have been stolen, and defendant was not det-
ained for an unreasonable period of time. We, 
therefore, affirm defendant's conviction. 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
1. At a bench trial, defendant was convicted on 
stipulated facts testified to at a previous hearing on 
defendant's motion to suppress. 
2. Utah has never drawn any distinctions between 
these two provisions and has "always considered the 
protections afforded to be one and the same." State 
v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988). 
However, in a footnote comment, the court indic-
ated that it has not ruled out the possibility of 
making such a distinction in a future case. Id, at n. 
8. 
ORME, Judge (dissenting): 
Although the legal analysis applicable to this 
case is ably set out in the majority's opinion, 
I cannot agree with their ultimate conclusion 
that the arresting officer had an articulable 
suspicion that the automobile had been stolen, 
much less that defendant had in any way 
participated in the theft. 
The only facts relied on by the officer were 
that the driver's name was not the name of 
the registered owner and the driver was not 
able to locate the registration certificate. These 
facts are just as consistent with the more likely 
scenario that the driver borrowed the car from 
its rightful owner. Absent more-and this is 
all the officer pointed to-there was simply 
no articulable suspicion, as a matter of law, 
that the car had been stolen. 
I would accordingly reverse. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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WICAT SYSTEMS, and Hartford Insurance 
Group, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
Sylvia PELLEGRINI, Second Injury Fund of 
Utah, and Industrial Commission of Utah, 
Respondents. 
No. 880218-CA 
FILED: March 22,1989 
Industrial Commission 
ATTORNEYS: 
Stuart L. Poelman, Salt Lake City, for 
Petitioners. 
Erie V. Boorman, Second Injury Fund, Salt 
Lake City, for Respondents. 
Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and Garff. 
OPINION 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
On June 21, 1983, Sylvia Pellegrini, an 
employee of Wicat Systems, injured her wrist 
while at work. In 1987, Pellegrini filed a claim 
with the Industrial Commission for permanent 
total disability. The parties stipulated that 
Pellegrini had a preexisting impairment of 
46Vo prior to 1980, that she incurred an add-
itional 129b impairment prior to 1983, that the 
injury to her wrist caused another 2497b imp-
airment,1 and that she was now, with the wrist 
injury, permanently and totally disabled. The 
only issue before the- Administrative Law 
Judge was the proper apportionment between 
Wicat Systems and the Second Injury Fund. 
The A.L.J, determined that Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-69 (as amended 1984) contr-
olled, even though Pellegrini's injury occurred 
in 1983, and so computed Wicat's share of the 
liability at 24/64ths or 37.59b. Wicat filed a 
motion for review claiming that the 1981 
version of section 35-1-69, which would 
have placed its share of liability at 12/64ths 
or 18.759b, should have instead been applied. 
The Commission denied Wicat's motion. 
The sole issue before us is whether the 1984 
amendments to section 35-1-69 were proc-
edural or remedial such that they could be 
applied retroactively to an injury that occurred 
before the effective date of the amendments.2 
We hold that the amendments were not rem-
edial, and, therefore, did not apply retroacti-
vely. 
In workers' compensation cases, we gener-
ally apply the law existing at the time of 
injury. Moore v. American Coal Co., 737 
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•t UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
t/ 
State of Utah/ 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Karen Marie Johnson, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER 
No. 870222-CA 
This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for 
Rehearing filed by the Appellant. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this 5th day of April, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
zl 
Mary ^./Noonan 
ClerkVf the Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of April/ 1989/ a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed to each of the 
following: 
Debra K. Loy 
Joan C. Watt 
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Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
424 East 500 South/ Suite 300 
Salt Lake City# Utah 84111 
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State Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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DEBRA K. LOY (3901) 
attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSN. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KAREN M." JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
Case No. CR86-1728 
HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO 
COMES NOW, the defendant, KAREN M. JOHNSON, by and through her 
attorney of record, DEBRA K. LOY, and hereby moves the Court to 
Suppress all evidence seized from her person or property including 
alleged amphetamines, alleged paraphernalia and alleged burglary tools 
on the grounds said items were the fruit of an unlawful seizure of her 
person in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution and Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of Utah. 
DATED this o day of January, 1987. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
e-\_ A. / 
DEBRA K. LOY 
Attorney for Defendant 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
You and each of you please take notice that the above-entitled 
matter will come on regularly for hearing on the 16th day of January, 
1987 at the hour of 11:00 a.m., before the Honorable RAYMOND S. UNO. 
DATED this $ day of January, 1987. 
*_ /iy /u 
DEBRA K. LOY 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the Salt Lake 
County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 
day of January, 1987. 
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1 but I think it's crucial,if we're this far apart on what 
2 the law is,that the Court see the careful analysis of 
3 this issue. 
4 THE COURT: I am inclined to deny the motion, 
5 but if you feel that you can find some case law that will 
6 support it — 
7 MS. LOY: I do. 
8 THE COURT: The cases that I have read, I 
9 don't think would support a motion to dismiss in a fact 
10 situation such as this where there was a legitimate stop 
11 because of a light, the officer asked the driver if she 
12 has a driver's license, she produces a driver's license, 
13 Land the driver's license is suspended. 
14 In addition to that, there's no registration 
15 so there is no way of telling who the owner of the vehicle 
16 is and whether they have permission to drive it, because 
17 the owner is not present. And it would seem to me that 
18 a reasonable officer would make inquiry regarding the 
19 identification of a passenger in the event the vehicle 
20 may be stolen. He doesn't know whether the vehicle is 
21 stolen, but there are enough stolen vehicles to justify, 
22 you know, reasonable inquiry by an officer. Because if 
23 thev let someone go. then they're in i-mnhlp. because 
24 i-hgy havp Ipt- enough go that I know of. 
25 MS. LOY: Well, your Honor, I would ask the 
35 
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Court then for the opportunity to submit a memorandum 
because I think the Court, in its own analysis here, is 
falling in a trap that we fall into frequently in considering 
the passenger the same as the driver. And I think that 
there are cases that distinguish that, and I would like 
to provide that. 
THE COURT: If you can find something, I would 
be glad to read it, but at this stage, you know, I am 
inclined to deny the motion. But if you can convince 
the Court that the Court is wrong in its analysis, then 
I will be glad to read that. 
MR. JONES: It's set for trial next Wednesday. 
MS. LOY: I think we have a pretrial this 
Friday, if I can submit — 
THE COURT: If you can have it by Friday. 
MS. LOY: — a very brief memorandum with 
our cases, I would appreciate the opportunity. 
THE COURT: All right. Okay. 
[Hearing concluded.] 
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APPENDIX E 
Because the officer's detention of Ms, Johnson was not 
supported by a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts, the 
detention violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. As a result, the evidence obtained as a result of the 
initial illegal detention, including that obtained in the search of 
Ms, Johnson's bag, should be suppressed in accordance with Terry v. 
Ohio, supra. 
POINT II. THE DETENTION OF MS. JOHNSON VIOLATED 
UTAH STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
While the Utah Supreme Court has followed the Fourth Amendment 
standard in deciding search and seizure cases argued under the Utah 
Constitution, (See State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 59 (Utah App. 1987), 
nothing prevents Utah from analyzing this Constitutional provision 
differently from the federal approach, especially in a case such as 
this where there is no Fourth Amendment case on point. 
In State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 321 (Alaska 1985), the 
Alaska Supreme Court found that it should "construe Alaska's 
constitutional provisions such as Article I, Section 14 as affording 
additional rights to those granted by the United States Supreme 
Court under the federal constitution." The Court in Jones chose to 
apply a more rigorous test to determine probable cause under Alaska 
law than is required under the federal constitution. The Washington 
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Supreme Court made a similar choice in State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 
136 (Wash. 1984). In Jackson, the Court found that the Washington 
Constitution provided greater protections then did the federal 
constitution to the citizens of that state against unreasonable 
searches and seizures by police. Id. at 143. 
In State v. Williams, 366 So. 2d 1369 (La. 1978), an 
officer stopped a vehicle to issue a citation, and ordered the 
passengers out of the car. As one of the passengers was getting 
out, the officer noticed a sawed off shotgun in the car. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that: 
(B)y stopping the automobile the police have decided 
that the driver will be detained. Such is not the 
case for the passenger, who has not broken the law 
and who may walk away from the scene unless the 
police officer has some other legitimate reason to 
detain him. Certainly the passenger has a higher 
expectation of privacy than the driver, because the 
passenger plays no part in the routine traffic 
infraction and has reason to suppose that any 
exchange with the authorities will be conducted by 
the driver alone. 
The Williams Court, without deciding the Fourteenth 
Amendment issue, held that under the Louisiana Constitution the 
detention of the passengers was not permissible. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended) provides: 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer may stop 
any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or 
is in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions. 
The language of U.C.A. §77-7-15 indicates an intent on 
the part of Utah's legislature to provide the citizens of this state 
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with greater protection than is provided by the federal constitution 
as interpreted in United States v. Merritt, supra. 
Pursuant to this statute, a peace officer may stop a 
person only when the officer has a "reasonable suspicion" that 
criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur. Hence, while 
the United States Constitution may allow for police citizen 
encounters absent a reasonable suspicion (See United States v. 
Merritt, supra), the Utah Legislature has provided otherwise, 
requiring a police officer to have a reasonable suspicion to stop 
and question a person. Hence, Utah statutory and constitutional law 
require a reasonable suspicion to stop and question an individual, 
even where the detention does not amount to a "seizure" under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
As outlined in Point I, the officer "seized" Ms. Johnson 
when he detained her to run a warrants check (See discussion at 5-7) 
(See also State v. Larocco, supra, for discussion of what 
constitutes a "seizure"). The language of the statute shows that in 
Utah, any detention for the purpose of asking an individual's name 
amounts to a seizure. However, even if this Court does not agree 
that any detention where the officer asks a person for 
identification amounts-to a seizure pursuant to Utah statutory and 
constitutional law, the detention of Ms. Johnson in this case was a 
seizure of her person. The officer detained Ms. Johnson for 
anywhere from several to fifteen minutes (T. 19, 28). The officer 
did more than merely obtain information regarding Ms. Johnson's 
identity. He expected her to remain in the car while he ran a 
warrants check; she was not free to leave and therefore was 
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detained. As the Court in United States v. Luckett, supra, found 
requiring a defendant to wait while a warrants check was run 
constituted a detention. 
The officer in this case had no objective facts upon 
which to base a reasonable suspicion to justify the detention of Ms. 
Johnson. The officer did know whether the car was stolen, nor did 
he run a check to find out even though he had the opportunity to do 
so (T. 12). Even if the car had been stolen (which it was not), 
there was nothing to connect Ms. Johnson to a crime which may have 
been committed by the driver (See State v. Banks, supra). The 
officer had a hunch which later proved to be incorrect; a hunch does 
not amount to a reasonable suspicion. 
The detention by the officer to check for outstanding 
warrants also constitutes a violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 
77-7-15 (1953 as amended). Pursuant to the statute, an officer must 
have reasonable suspicion before questioning a person about her name 
and address. Under the facts of the instant case, no such suspicion 
could have attached to Ms. Johnson. 
As officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the 
detention of Ms. Johnson, the evidence that flowed from the unlawful 
seizure should have'been suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Ms. Johnson 
requests this Court to reverse the conviction and the trial court's 
ruling on the motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial 
court with an order to suppress the evidence, and dismiss the 
charges or provide for a new trial without such evidence. 
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